The problem of evil has perplexed even the most prominent of philosophers for centuries. How is it that a being that is all-knowing, all-powerful and all-good could allow evil to exist? Some contend that God cannot exist merely for this obvious contradiction between evil and an omnibenevolent being. Furthermore, the very existence of evil leads to the inevitable questioning of God’s chaste abilities.

David Hume authors a much recognized take on the problem of evil. In this conjecture Hume posits, “Is he willing to prevent evil, but not able? Then is he impotent. Is he able, but not willing? Then is he malevolent. Is he both able and willing? Whence then is evil?” (Hume, Dialogs). It is a seemingly deplorable accusation to insist that the monotheistic God of the 17th century is both powerless and wicked.

Another argument involves the existence of evil and how it was compatible with holiness, if at all. Since God is the creator of everything, he is then the creator of evil as well. So, if God is the creator of evil, it follows that God is not holy or morally pure. Finally, if such a being existed, then the apparently flawed world as it is would represent a world that is an immense failing on God’s part. With little doubt, Leibniz spends a great deal of his writing to attempt to solve these apparent contradictions between God and evil (Murray, Last Seminary).

There are many interpretations into the problem of evil and even more in either explaining how evil fits into a world where there indeed exists a God or in explaining away God’s existence due to the fact that there exists evils—caused by both humans and nature.

There are two main arguments relevant to the problem of evil. The first is referred to as ‘the underachiever problem.’ According to this problem, if there existed an omnipotent, omnibenevolent and omniscient God, then the mere existence of this evidently imperfect world represents quite well God’s failure to create a more perfect world (Murray, Last Seminary). Thus, two conclusions may follow: One, there exists no God, or two, God is not as good or as powerful as once thought.

Leibniz responds to the problem that the world is a faulty one on God’s part by explaining that God has chosen the best of all possible worlds; God is constrained by his goodness to create the best of all possible worlds. Furthermore, Leibniz would argue that because God is all-knowing, all-powerful and all-good, there is certainly nothing in his way to create the best world possible. However, one could argue against Leibniz’s reasoning in a quite compelling way. One could contend that God might not have created the best possible world if there were no best world to begin with. For instance, perhaps there was a series of possible worlds, one better than the last, to ad infinitum. If this were true, then God could have not chosen the best possible world in just the same way as I could not name the highest possible number. As well, if God is omnibenevolent and omniscient, and in choosing the best possible world, knowing that there would be injustices, suffering, pain, sin, evil, etc., God would have not been so obliged to create a world to begin with. Leibniz, however, would argue that because there in fact exists a world and since God is in fact omnibenevolent, then our world is in fact the best of all possible worlds.

Though as aware as Leibniz was of the objections I’ve presented, he would be quick to reject them. One of Leibniz’s most central principles was his Principle of Sufficient Reason. According to this principle, every thing—every event, every effect, something’s existence—is the way it is because there is a sufficient (and necessary) reason for it to be the way it is as it is now and not some other way. So then, concerning our world—why it is the way it is; why there is evil, why is it the best possible of all worlds—it is the way it is because there must be some reason that explains it. We, as infallible beings with limited intellect, may not know the necessary reason, but just because we cannot think of this reason does not mean that such a reason does not exist.

So, even if there were a continuum of worlds to choose from, Leibniz would argue that there is a sufficient reason as to why God chose this particular world and that reason is that this world is the best possible world. But concluding that Leibniz’s principle of sufficient reason is enough to explain away the underachiever problem may actually propose another question.
I will state the question in the form of a syllogism:

1. If God were omnipotent, omniscient and omnibenevolent, then this world is the best possible.
2. This is not the best possible world (from quite evident observations).
3. Thus, God is not all-powerful, all-knowing and all-good.

Leibniz would conclude that one of the two premises is incorrect. Since he is committed to the first as true, he will reject the second, and for good reason. For, what reason do I have to assume that this is not the best possible world? One would argue against Leibniz stating that this current world we live in is riddled with evil; from earthquakes, tsunamis, and bombings to murder, famine, and injustice, a world without all this would surely be the better world.

Leibniz would respond in a few ways. First, though there may be certain aspects in the world that we assume could be better, there is no way of knowing that it is possible to create a better world without those particular aspects since we cannot know what relevant and vital connections other events and aspects have to those in question. If, somehow, we were able to change certain aspects we believed to manifest in evil without changing anything any thing else, then perhaps we could have a better world. But because we have no way of knowing what sort of changes may take place—we may make the world worse, it may stay the same or it may become better…

Second, stating that our world is filled with evil is quite a subjective and deceptive criticism. We presume that God’s standards of goodness are the same as our own. In addition, we presume that a world is good only if these particular aspects in it are also good or a world is good only if humans are to be happy. Time and time again does Leibniz argue that it is much too narrow minded to think that God uses the same evaluative process as humans do to determine what in the world is good or evil. In fact, Leibniz argues that the best world is one which yields the greatest variety of phenomena governed by the simplest set of laws.

With this interpretation, Leibniz emphasizes the fact that the perfection in a world that maximizes phenomena is enhanced by simplest of laws since it manifests the intelligence of the creator who actualized and created the world. With this being an argument for the best possible world, it becomes increasingly difficult to disregard Leibniz’s stance on his best of all possible worlds theory. For instance, if we were able to undo the 9/11 event, what would be required of us to do just that? We could perhaps, through some divine and marvelous intervention, interfere somewhere along the chain of events that led up to that incident. God could perhaps make it so that the planes never left the ground or cause the individuals involved in the hijack to simply vanish. But in order to do this, the laws governing phenomena would become much more complex (rather than having the laws as simple as can be, as Leibniz would have it).

Thus, Leibniz maintains that we cannot know how altering certain events (events that humans think are an unspeakable evil) would change the world’s capacity to meet his standard of greatest number of phenomena with the simplest set of laws. Consequentially, we can never, with certain confidence, assume that this world is not the best possible world.

The second main difficulty concerning the problem of evil is often referred to the Holiness Problem (Murray, Last Seminary). As previously mentioned, this problem states that God’s holy characteristics have been tainted since he knowingly contributes to the existence of evil as he is the creator of every thing, including evil. Some would contest that evil is not a thing. Rather, it is a lack of something. So, God could not be the creator of evil. To make this concept clearer, we can equate the reality of evil to the reality of a hole in a donut. To make a donut, we needn’t make a donut cake and the hole to complete the donut. Though as compelling at this argument may seem, Leibniz would argue against this analogy because his world is totally and absolutely complete—a plenum—and without gaps. The hole in the donut as it relates to evil being a hole in the world is irreverent as it presents a gap in the world.

Leibniz not only argues to the Holiness Problem, as we shall get to shortly, but he also argues the response to the Holiness Problem. Leibniz believes the “evil is a lacking” response fails as a justifiable answer to the Holiness problem. Leibniz asserts that God is the creator of everything—all the real and positive things in the world. So, through extension, God is also the creator of anything that is a lacking or privation.

In The Author of Sin (Leibniz, Philosophical Confessions), Leibniz gives an example. Imagine a painter that created two paintings: one on a smaller scale and the other on a much larger scale. Everything else in the painting is exactly the same; it is only the scale that is different. It would be absurd to say that painter is the creator of all that is real in the two paintings, but not being the creator of the privations or whatever is lacking that are visible in the smaller painting.

So, even if the criticism that evil is a privation is true, it still does not follow, according to Leibniz, that God is not the creator such privations. Leibniz argues away the Holiness Problem in a different way. He says that evil is a necessary byproduct of God performing his duty—his duty to create the best possible world. He is careful to emphasize that God’s actions of allowing evil to create the best possible world is morally permissible since it is a necessary consequence rather than evil is just a result in trying to create a greater good that is not otherwise attainable.

The matters that appear in Leibniz’s theory of the problem of evil were enthusiastically discussed among philosophers of his own time and, are still to this day, discussed in much detail. It is an effortless task in realizing the different evils in the world: those are the manmade like murder, wars, terrorism and those that are brought through nature; earthquakes, droughts, floods, etc. It is a natural question to ask how does God allow for such evils. Though Leibniz presents a compelling and logical solution to this problem, a perfect resolution is not likely to come about. Leibniz’s solution to the problem of evil is just one of many theories. And considering it is such a metaphysical question, it is not easy to resolve it through tangible evidence which may prove to be more substantiated.

Leibniz’s theory to resolve such a problem follows logically from his principles of sufficient reason and the best possible of all worlds. There is no more a reason to think that a better world exists than to think that this is the better world except for the fact that this very world we live in exists—thus this is the best possible world even with its evils and imperfections.

Secondary Sources:
1. Hume, David, and Dorothy Coleman. Dialogues concerning natural religion and other writings. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2007. Print.

2. Leibniz, Gottfried Wilhelm, R. C. Sleigh, Brandon Look, and James H. Stam. Confessio philosophi: papers concerning the problem of evil, 1671-1678. New Haven: Yale University Press, 2005. Print.

3. Murray, Michael J., 1995, “Leibniz on Divine Knowledge of Conditional Future Contingents and Human Freedom,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 55: 75-108.

4. Murray, Michael J.. “Leibniz on the Problem of Evil.” Last Seminary – Problem of Evil. N.p., n.d. Web. 11 May 2011. .

May 13th, 2011